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Abstract
Asymmetric economic structures across Europe may result in common shocks having
asymmetric effects. In this paper we investigate whether the differences in the structure and
dynamics that we observe in the European economies matter for policy design. In particular it
is widely believed that labour market responses are different, with the structure of labour
demand and the nature of the bargain over wages differing between countries. In addition the
European economies move at different speeds in response to common shocks. In this paper
we construct three different models of Europe, one where the labour market relationships are
separately estimated and assumed to be different, one where the most statistically acceptable
commonalties are imposed and one where common labour market relationships are imposed
across all member countries. We use panel estimation techniques to test for the imposition of
commonalties among countries. We find that it is possible to divide Europe into sub-groups,
but it is not possible to have one model of European labour markets. We use stochastic
simulation techniques on these different models of Europe and find that the preferred rule for
the ECB is a combined nominal aggregate and inflation-targeting rule. We find that while this
rule is dominant in all our models, the more inertia that is introduced into the labour markets,
the more a nominal aggregate-targeting rule alone may be preferred. However, we conclude,
that differences in the labour market transmission mechanisms across the European countries
appear to have little influence on the setting of monetary policy for the ECB, although this
depends on the relative importance of the different components in the welfare loss function.
Key Words: Labour markets, Asymmetries, Monetary policy rules, feedback rules, stochastic
simulations, Macro-economic stabilisation.
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IS THE POLICY STANCE OF THE ECB THE MOST APPROPRIATE ONE
IN THE FACE OF AN UNCERTAIN WORLD?
The European Central Bank has frequently been criticised for inefficient communication and
lack of transparency and credibility. Criticism of its policy stance, albeit not absent, has been
much more subdued. Many observers, in fact, have recognised that the combination of money
base targeting and inflation targeting adopted by the ECB during recent years probably was
the most appropriate one, given the uncertainties concerning both the evolution of the world
economy and state of the  EU’s internal market. This argument receives academic
underpinning in this ENEPRI Working Paper by Ray Barrell and Karen Dury of the London-
based National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).
Barrell and  Dury first analyse the wage determination process in the major European
economies and examine the possibility of asymmetries in the bargaining process. In this
phase of the study they also investigate the significance of any differences in the transmission
mechanism by testing three models determined essentially by the degree of homogeneity
across Europe with respect to the degree to which wage determination is influenced by the
rate of unemployment. The first model consists of the individual estimated country equations,
the second model assumes homogeneity within groups of countries while the third model
assumes full homogeneity (no asymmetry).
In the next phase of the study, the authors then feed these three models of wage bargaining
into the NiGEM model, a quarterly General Equilibrium Model constructed and run by
NIESR. Using this model they calculate the effects of a loosening of monetary policy (a 5%
increase in the money supply) applied to the three versions of the model. The simulations
over a period of 18 years show a higher degree of variability of target parameters (output,
unemployment and inflation) in the models with partial (model 2) or full (model 3)
homogeneity than in the model assuming heterogeneity (model 1). They then simulate the
variability of parameters using three different monetary policy rules: (i) targeting  of nominal
GDP, (ii) targeting a combination of nominal GDP and inflation, and (iii) targeting of
inflation. The principal conclusion is that for Euroland as a whole a monetary policy rule
targeting a combination of nominal GDP (or money supply) and the rate of inflation in all
three model specifications provides a better outcome than targeting only inflation or only a
nominal variable. For the UK (considered as a small open economy) targeting the rate of
inflation would be preferable.
And the authors conclude that if the ECB designs its monetary policy according to a world
where all countries are assumed to have the same labour market transmission mechanisms
(model 3) but where the economies actually do show different responses, it would probably
still choose the same policy rule.
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1. Introduction
There is a consensus that the economies of Europe have significant differences in their
transmission processes and our aim in this paper is to determine whether the differences in
the structure and dynamics that we observe in the European wage bargaining system matters
for policy design. The European Central Bank, ECB, has sole responsibility for setting the
Euroland interest rate with the prime objective of maintaining price stability. The ECB will
design its policy responses for the world it thinks exists and these responses will have
different costs depending on the asymmetries across Europe. With differences remaining in
the structure of the wage bargaining process across countries, a common monetary policy will
have different impacts. If the ECB sets monetary policy for a world where it is assumed that
all countries react in the same way, but actually is heterogeneous, then there could be
significant costs involved that could be avoided if a reasonable description of the world were
to be used. In EMU the monetary response is common to any shock however asymmetric,
and the differential monetary shock absorbers have been removed. Given that one differential
shock absorber has been removed more active fiscal policies could be implemented, but this
may be constrained by the Maastricht Treaty and by the Stability Pact. Current policies may
not be able to work as well in EMU as they did with floating or movable rates and it is
important to evaluate the consequences of this. Policy settings that are the optimal choice for
EMU may not be the optimal choice for individual countries. We will investigate how the
dispersion cost changes as the structure of the European economy converges, and hence we
will be able to discuss the policy problems facing the ECB Council. We aim to quantify these
costs by examining 3 different models of the European wage bargain. Each of these
represents a different strategy and a different conception of the way the Euro zone economy
works. We can analyse policy problems when equations for wages in all countries are
separately estimated and assumed to be different. We can also analyse policy when all
countries are assumed to react identically and an intermediate case where we impose the most
statistically acceptable commonalties.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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The aim of this research is two fold. First we wish to analyse the wage determination process
in the major European economies and examine the possibility of asymmetries in the
bargaining process. We investigate the significance of any differences in the transmission
mechanisms by examining the extent to which it is possible to group the countries together.
We then ask how important potential differences may be for policy setting by the ECB. If
significant differences remain between countries then a common monetary policy will result
in asymmetric effects. We wish to investigate the importance of any asymmetries in the
transmission of policy and this is achieved by undertaking stochastic simulation exercises on
NiGEM.
In order to undertake the evaluation of these models they are embedded in the National
Institute’s Global Econometric Model, which is a coherent large-scale forward-looking model
of the world economy. We first examine a set of deterministic shocks on each of the 3
models, which gives a clear comparison of the effects under a very specific shock. However,
to investigate whether the structural differences across Europe matter it is also necessary to
use stochastic simulation techniques so that the response to a sequence of random shocks can
be evaluated. We examine the effects for individual member countries and EMU as a whole.
We find that for the first model where the labour market structures are estimated separately
that the preferred monetary policy rule for the ECB is a combined nominal and inflation
targeting rule. We then investigate different rules for each of the 3 models and discuss the
choice of rule in a converging Europe.
The paper is set out as follows: Section 1 describes the theoretical framework we adopt for
analysing wage determination in the major European countries. Section 3 presents the
empirical results for each model and discusses the process for estimating wage equations for
the three different models of Europe. Section 4 sets out the second stage of the paper giving
an outline of the policy environment used in the analysis, a brief summary of the techniques
used to undertake stochastic simulations and an overview of NiGEM.
1 Section 5 presents the
results from the stochastic simulations and examines the implications of a common monetary
policy across Europe.
                                                
1 Appendix A gives a fuller explanation of the stochastic simulations techniques and a more detailed
description of the model.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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2. Labour markets across Europe
In order to assess the significance of the differences in transmission mechanisms across
European labour markets we need an adequate description of the process of wage
determination. The extensive literature on the analysis of labour markets within a bargaining
framework is discussed and extended in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). In this paper
we use their framework as set out in Barrell, Morgan and Pain (1995) and so consequently
our theoretical discussion is brief. We assume that the bargain takes place in a right to
manage framework, with employers determining employment after the bargain over wages
has been struck. The outcome will depend on the objectives of the bargainers, their relative
strengths and the environment in which they operate. We assume that in the long run the real
wage is given by:
( )
e U od a
P
W
l - + = ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ Pr ln ln (1)
Where W is the nominal wage, P is a measure of producer prices, Prod is trend output per
person hour and Ue is the long run sustainable level of unemployment. The equations were
estimated in an Error Correction format with dynamics estimated round the long run. The
general specification of the wage equations are given by:
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where U is the level of unemployment and CED is the consumer price deflator. A unit long
run coefficient on productivity was imposed and dynamic terms in wages, prices, and
unemployment were included. Where possible, dynamic homogeneity was imposed in order
that our models could be super neutral.
2 As the bargain is struck over the expected real wage
our analysis has to take this into account. Employees form expectations about the
development of future consumer prices and this affects their bargain with employers.
                                                
2 This is to ensure that inflation doesn’t affect the real side of the economy.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Expectations of future inflation were extracted using instrumental variables on the future
inflation.
3
3. Models of European wage bargaining
In this section we present the empirical results for 3 models of the European wage bargaining
process. Model 1 is where the labour markets in each of the European countries have been
estimated separately and are therefore assumed to be different. Model 2 has been estimated
using panel techniques where the most statistically acceptable commonalties have been
imposed across countries. Model 3 is where common labour market relationships have been
imposed across all countries to yield a single representative equation for the European wage
bargaining process. We present each model in turn and discuss the results.
3.1 Model 1
We have always presumed in our modelling that economic structures remain very different
between European countries. The impact of a symmetric shock across countries, including
interest rate changes, will differ in relation to the scale and speed with which the economy
responds to that shock. A number of studies agree that significant differences remain in the
transmission mechanisms across European countries Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) show
that the response of member countries differs considerably to either demand or supply
shocks. They show that there are significant differences in the size and adjustment speeds of
EMU member countries. They along, with Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998), they show that
there is a core group of countries, consisting of Austria, Germany, Belgium, Finland and the
Netherlands, that have a faster adjustment of the economy to the steady state than in another
group of countries including, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy. In the latter group the
adjustment period is twice as large. Dornbusch et al. (1998) also come to similar conclusions.
In this section we construct a model of European labour markets that characterise their ‘true’
underlying structure. There is continual structural change in labour markets and sustainable
unemployment changes when policies change and so we construct models for each country
that reflects the economies we are studying. Each labour market equation is estimated
separately and then individually tested on NiGEM for its simulation properties. We aim to
                                                
3 Instruments include lagged consumer price inflation, producer price inflation and capacity
utilisation.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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construct models of each country that ensures the simulation properties are a good
representation of their labour market characteristics. Therefore the model selection criteria,
comprises of two parts, estimating a reasonable wage equation for each country separately
and then testing that equation on NiGEM. The wage equation included in the country model
on NiGEM will be a good statistical description that ensures the simulation properties of the
model give a good representation of that particular labour market. The best statistical
description may include a number of lagged terms in the dynamics but this may cause some
chaotic behaviour in simulations. As a consequence, it may be necessary to allow some serial
correlation in the equation so as to keep sensible simulation properties.
Table 1 presents the wage equations for the each individual country. The estimation
procedure was to start with a general error correction model with a rich dynamic specification
for each country, (as described in equation 2 above), and adopt the ‘general to specific’
approach to eliminate insignificant variables. The dynamic responses observed in the wage
equations are the result of conscious construction of labour market institutions. All
relationships were tested for structural change in the labour markets. For example we found
strong evidence of a structural change in the role of unemployment in Germany at
reunification in 1991, with the role of unemployment in moderating wages becoming
significantly higher after unification. Evidence was found of a structural break in Italy in
1993 when the wage indexation formalised by the ‘Scala Mobile’ was abolished and a
significant structural break was also found in the Spanish wage equation in 1987, after Spain
joined the ERM.
4
                                                
4 See Barrell and Genre (1999) for recent work on labour markets.Asymmetric Labour Markets in a Converging Europe: Do differences matter?
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Table 1. Model 1 results – Country-specific estimates
GE FR SP IT NL BG PT IR FN OE UK MEAN MIN MAX
CONS -0.743
(4.7)
-0.448
(2.6)
-0.733
(2.7)
-0.692
(2.4)
-0.305
(9.3)
-1.151
(3.00)
-0.305
(9.3)
-0.433
(2.6)
-0.858
(3.7)
-0.305
(9.3)
-0.475
(3.0)
-0.451 -1.151 0.743
U(-1) -0.006
(5.4)
-0.001
(2.7)
-0.001
(4.8)
-0.0037
(2.4)
0.004
(1.2)
-0.003
(2.9)
0.004
(1.2)
-0.001
(3.2)
-0.003
(5.0)
0.004
(1.2)
-0.0021
(2.8)
-0.001 -0.006 0.004
U -0.005
(1.5)
-0.005
(1.5)
-0.005
(1.5)
-0.001 -0.005 -0.005
DP 0.624
(2.5)
0.534
(5.3)
0.444
(6.7)
0.534
(5.3)
0.534
(5.3)
0.243 0.444 0.624
DP(-1) 0.635
(3.4)
0.466
(4.7)
0.556
(-)
0.466
(4.7)
0.466
(4.7)
0.235 0.466 0.635
DP(+1) 0.364
(3.9)
0.348
(6.3)
0.604
(3.0)
0.339
(2.8)
0.583
(2.4)
0.394
(2.2)
0.239 0.339 0.604
DEP (-1) -0.170
(4.00)
0.6076
(4.6)
-0.248
(2.8)
0.017 -0.248 0.608
DEP (-2) 0.652
(6.3)
0.053
(4.6)
0.064 0.053 0.652
ECORR -0.167
(4.8)
-0.094
(2.7)
-0.155
(2.8)
-0.150
(2.4)
-0.061
(9.4)
-0.236
(2.9)
-0.061
(9.4)
-0.092
(2.8)
-0.176
(3.8)
-0.061
(9.4)
-0.102
(3.1)
-0.123 -0.236 -0.061
Note: GE = Germany; FR = France; SP = Spain; IT = Italy; NL = Netherlands; BG = Belgium; PT = Portugal; IR = Ireland; FN = Finland; OE =
Austria; UK = United Kingdom.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Each equation was then tested for its simulation properties on  NiGEM and the equations
given in Table 1 were the final equations chosen. In general it was possible to impose
dynamic homogeneity.
The dynamics and speed of adjustment differ among the European countries. We did not find
a role for expectations in all countries and in some there is a clear mixture of backward and
forward dynamics. We found a significant role for expected inflation in France, Spain, Italy,
Ireland, Finland and the United Kingdom with the greatest role for expectations in the Italian
wage bargain. However, not all countries display forward elements in the wage bargain, and
we have not found them in Germany, the Netherlands or Austria. The likely reason for the
absence of significant forward-looking behaviour in the German wage bargaining process,
relates to the anti-inflationary successes of the Bundesbank. Germany and Austria
experienced low levels of inflation with low variability and hence expectations probably
varied very little. The long run coefficients on unemployment range from – 0.036 in Germany
to –0.006 in Spain, suggesting that a 1% point rise in unemployment will reduce the level of
real wages by between 0.6 and 3.6 percent in the long run. The impact on wages of a rise in
unemployment is largest in Germany and the low coefficient in Spain, and indeed France and
Ireland, suggests a greater degree of inertia in those countries, reflecting institutional
rigidities. The speed of adjustment of real wages to deviations from the long run (given by
ECORR) ranges from 0.06 in the Netherlands to 0.23 in Belgium. The average for the group
is 0.12. Out of the four largest Euroland economies, only wages in France adjusts more
slowly than the average. The UK’s speed of adjustment is also lower than the average
estimate.
We next investigate whether it is possible to impose any commonalties across.
 3.2 Model 2
For our Model 2 our aim was to impose as many commonalties across countries as possible,
i.e. we wanted to construct a model for European wage bargaining that applied as widely as
possible in a statistically defendable way. We adopt the common procedure for estimating
panel models, the dynamic fixed effect approach, where the intercepts are allowed to differASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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across groups while all other parameters are constrained to be the same.
5 We started with a
general unrestricted model of European wage bargaining, which included all dynamic terms
encompassed in Model 1 above, but with dynamic homogeneity imposed and with each
country equation retaining any structural breaks that had been identified in Model 1. We use a
balanced data set from 1970Q1 to 1998Q4 and estimated the equations using the Seemingly
Unrelated Regression Equation procedure (SURE). SURE allows the contemporaneous error
covariances to be freely estimated which is a valid estimation procedure when N, (here the
number of countries) is small relative to T, the number of observations. We first used a Wald
test to see if we could impose common parameters across all countries. We found that
imposing homogeneity across all parameters was an invalid restriction. (This is in fact Model
3 where we simply impose homogeneity, a more detailed discussion is given in the following
section).
We then tested the possibility of imposing homogeneity across subgroups of countries. We
estimated the equations in SURE for all countries without imposing constraints. We
calculated the mean group estimator, MGE, and compared it to the restricted, or full panel
estimate. In general the dynamics were slower in the panel, as can be seen in the table below.
We were unable to impose the MGE, as shown in Table 3, and we looked for groups of
countries with dynamics that were slower or faster than the MGE. The failure to impose the
MGE is common in heterogeneous panels with disparate time responses. In such situations it
is common for the speed of response in the panel to be lower than the MGE as here,
indicating the biases calculated in Pesaran & Smith (1995).
Table 2 presents the results for the model where the most statistically acceptable
commonalties are imposed across countries. We found that the European economies could be
divided up into two subgroups. The first group consists of the core northern European
countries, Germany, France, Netherlands and Austria. The second group consists of the
Southern Europeans, Spain, Italy and Portugal. It was not statistically possible to include
Belgium, Finland, Ireland or the UK in either group, nor was it possible to create a new
                                                
5 We could be less restrictive and examine the Pool Mean Group estimators where only the long run
coefficients are constrained and short run dynamics are allowed to differ freely in the estimation.
However the aim of this paper is to construct a world where the European labour markets converge
and then examine the implications of that for monetary policy. We do not aim to extensively compare
different panel estimation techniques here, that is left for future research.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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subgroup containing any of these countries. We tried to pool Ireland and the UK together but
this failed the Wald test. For these countries we kept the original equations for the stochastic
simulation experiments.
Apart from Italy, Group 1 contains the largest economies in  Euroland and makes up over
60% of Euroland output. It should be noted that the inclusion of Austria was only possible if
we allowed idiosyncratic dynamics. However, only the coefficient on the second lag in the
change in prices, DP(-1), was allowed to be estimated freely for this country. We also had to
include an idiosyncratic dynamic term in Portugal in Group 2, this was the second lag of the
dependant variable which was allowed to be estimated freely.
6
Table 2.  Model 2 results (70q1 –98q4)
Group 1 : GE, FR, NL and OE Group 2 : SP,  IT and PT MGE
(model 3)
FE MGE MIN MAX FE MGE MIN MAX
CONS * -0.060 -0.579 0.340 * -0.134 -0.394 0.184 -0.297
U(-1) -0.001
(4.5)
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(3.7)
-0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
U - - - - - - - -
D DP 0.402
(8.7)
0.290 0.139 0.431 0.326
(3.8)
-0.111 -0.782 0.321 0.210
D DP(-1) 0.262
(5.3)
0.202 -0.036 0.580 0.255
(3.3)
0.103 -0.472 0.500 0.269
D DP(+1) 0.336
(-)
0.508 0.282 0.789 0.480
(-)
0.966 0.172 1.421 0.465
DEP (-1) - - - - 0.092
(1.8)
0.085 0.078 0.090 -
DEP (-2) - - - - -0.154
(2.8)
-0.043 -0.154 0.136 0.056
ECOR -0.068
(4.43)
-0.080 -0.119 -0.063 -0.036
(2.1)
-0.036 -0.087 0.025 -0.065
Wald
statistic
c(11)
=12.48
(0.328)
c(11)
=13.40
(0.268)
Note: * country specific. GE = Germany; FR = France; SP = Spain; IT = Italy; NL = Netherlands; BG
 = Belgium; PT = Portugal; IR = Ireland; FN = Finland; OE = Austria; UK = United Kingdom.
                                                
6 Therefore we have one less degree of freedom than the table would indicate ((N-1) * no of
constraints = 12) for each group.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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The main variable of interest is the error correction term,
7 which indicates the length of time
it takes for wages to adjust to deviations from the long run equilibrium. It gives the
proportion of the deviation that is closed each period and the lower the estimate, the more
time it takes to adjust to the disequilibrium and the more inertia there is in the economy.
Group 2 shows more signs of inertia than the core Euroland economies where the estimate for
the speed of adjustment is half that in Group 1. Model 2 has a lot more inertia than Model 1
where the countries were estimated freely. The panel estimate for the speed of adjustment for
Group 1 is slower than the Mean Group Estimator is, however for Group 2 they are the same.
In Group 1 we found the most statistically acceptable panel model did not include any
endogenous dynamics whereas it was necessary to include them in Group 2. Forward looking
behaviour can be retained in both cases but the core Europeans appear to be less forward
looking than the southern Europeans, at least after structural breaks in the early 1990s.
3.3 Model 3
Table 3 presents the results for the model where common labour market relationships are
imposed across all countries and therefore statistical testing to determine the poolability of all
countries is likely to fail. Our aim was to construct one model of the European wage
bargaining process. Although the model gives reasonable estimates and significant t statistics
for each variable, the assumption of homogeneity in across all countries was rejected. The
aggregate equation has slow dynamics, as indicated by ECOR, and a significant role for
unemployment.
We followed standard procedures in time series modelling. We started with the full
encompassing model for the wage bargaining process and deleted any insignificant variables.
We found no role for the first lag in the dependent variable however we did find a role for a
further lag in the dependant variable in the model. The speed of adjustment to deviations
from the long run equilibrium again is slower in Model 3 than in Model 2 and considerably
slower than Model 1. Testing to see if the restrictions implied by this model were valid
unsurprisingly failed as the speed differences indicate heterogeneity. We also tested to see if
it were possible to impose the error correction term to be the Mean Group Estimate while
                                                
7 It is common to calculate indicators of nominal and real rigidities using the mean lag of the equation
and the long run coefficient on unemployment (see Layard et al. (1991). However in dynamicallyASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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letting the dynamics to differ freely among countries. We found that it was not possible to
accept the null hypothesis of homogeneity. This has not been commonly tested in models
constructed using panel techniques and it is clearly possible that they are not valid
descriptions of the world they attempt to analyse.
Table 3. Model 3 results
FE MGE MIN MAX
CONS * -0.297 -0.977 0.377
U(-1) -0.002
(8.8)
-0.002 -0.004 0.001
U - - - -
D DP 0.384
(10.5)
0.210 -0.249 0.510
D DP(-1) 0.295
(8.4)
0.269 0.022 0.476
D DP(+1) 0.321
(-)
0.465 0.116 0.935
DEP (-1) - - - -
DEP (-2) 0.061
(2.5)
0.056 -0.186 0.301
ECOR -0.046
(5.1)
-0.065 -0.198 0.059
* Country specific.
The aim of this paper is to take the three models of the European Wage bargaining process
described above and embed them into the NiGEM framework. We then undertake stochastic
simulation exercises to investigate the importance of the differences across European labour
markets.
4. The model and policy response
NiGEM is an estimated model, which uses a ‘New-Keynesian’ framework in that agents are
presumed to be forward-looking but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to
external events. The theoretical structure and the relevant simulation properties of NiGEM
are described in Barrell and Sefton (1997) and NIESR (2000). The model has a full
                                                                                                                                                       
homogeneous equations the mean lag is zero. Other indicators must be used, but these are not in
widespread used (Turner, Richardson and Rauffet (1996).ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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description of all the economies of the OECD, including South Korea.
8 Each economy has a
supply side, a demand side, and a full set of asset accumulation relationships including a
complete set of government sector, foreign sector and private sector financial accounts.
Exchange rates follow the forward looking open arbitrage condition, and hence they can
‘jump’ when there is news, and long term interest rates are the forward convolution of
expected future short rates and they can also ‘jump’ in the first period. Policy rules are
important in ‘closing the model’ and we have them for fiscal and monetary policy. We
assume budget deficits are kept within bounds in the longer term, and taxes rise to do this.
Governments are assumed to slowly adjust tax rates to offset any changes in their deficit from
its target trajectory, and hence they remain solvent in the simulation (See Barrell and Sefton
(1997)). Further details are given in the annex.
The model is solved in a sequence of loops, utilising the sparse structure of forward links in
time. A shock is applied, and the model is run over the full time period, and interest rates are
allowed to be endogenous. A fall in demand will, for instance, cut interest rates. Forward
looking agents know this, and we emulate this knowledge by running the model a second
time, but calculating the long rate as the forward convolution of short rates in the previous
run. The model is continually run forward and starts again, and this is repeated until a
solution is found where rates of growth of expected variables are constant at the terminal
date, and all equations are converged.
We concentrate on the use of various simple policy rules as opposed to complex optimal
rules.
9 We compare four possible feedback rules for the interest rate that are nested within
one general policy rule. We focus on a standard monetary policy rule, where the central bank
targets some monetary or nominal aggregate, a combined nominal aggregate and inflation
targeting rule, and a pure inflation targeting rule with different feedback coefficients. It
appears from Duisenberg (1998), that the ECB has adopted a combination of money base
targeting and inflation targeting and so in this paper we evaluate this rule against other rules
nested within it.
                                                
8 China is also modelled separately and there are regional blocs for East Asia, Latin America, Africa,
Miscellaneous Developing Countries and Developing Europe.
9 One of the main reasons for the widespread use of simple rules on large macroeconomic models is
that they are easy to understand and interpret. Advocates of simple policy rules argue that they areASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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In order to investigate the performance of these regimes we need to give an explicit form to
the policy rule that is to be followed in this analysis. The three interest rate rules we
investigate are encompassed by:
10
*) ( *) ( 2 1 t t t t t Y Y r p p g g - + - = (1)
where r is the short term nominal interest rate, p = the annualised domestic inflation rate, Y is
log of nominal output and an astrix denotes target variables. The policy rule that the ECB
follows will depend on the aggregates for the Euro zone and interest rates react to theses.
The table below summarises the policy rules and the value of the feedback parameters used in
this analysis.
Table 4. Summary of policy rules and feedback parameters
Type of rule Parameter values
g1 g2
NOM Nominal GDP targeting rule 50 0
CR Combined nominal GDP and inflation targeting rule 50 1
INFT Inflation targeting rule 0 1
We use the terms, nominal GDP and monetary aggregate, as substitutes for each other, as a
velocity de-trended monetary aggregate will move in line with nominal GDP in the medium
term. We do not assume that the authorities wish to hit their target period by period so
responses will be similar with either target. The rules used in this paper use the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) inflation rate as a target.
11 The rules target the current rate of inflation and
the current level of a nominal magnitude. It is sometimes argued that a measure of forecast
inflation is more appropriate due to the lag in monetary policy affecting the economy.
12
However we believe it is likely that the ECB is actually reacting to what it perceives as
current conditions, which are endogenous in our framework (and it is also the case that in a
                                                                                                                                                       
helpful in monitoring the performance of the authorities (see, for instance, Taylor (1985) and (1999)).
A high degree of transparency gives them a considerable advantage.
10 For further details on policy rules that are encompassed within a general framework see Barrell,
Dury and Hurst (1999)
11 Issues arising from targeting the domestic inflation rate (where only inflation in the domestic
component of the CPI, or GDP deflator, is targeted) are dealt with in Svensson (2000).
12 See Svensson (1997).ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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forward looking model current conditions are in part reflecting expectations of future
outturns). For these reasons we concentrate on using current deviations from target in our
rules.
5. Stochastic simulations
The world is constantly faced with shocks; they can be large and infrequent or small and
frequent. It is impossible to know where the next major surprise will come from. By
repeatedly addressing the model with different sets of shocks it is possible to evaluate the
range over which a variable may fall. Stochastic simulations require that shocks are taken at
random from a particular distribution and repeatedly applied to the model. From this the
moments of the solution of the endogenous variables can be calculated and variability
investigated. Stochastic simulations can be either in respect to the error terms, coefficient
estimates or both. In this paper we assume that the coefficient estimates are known with
certainty and the stochastic shocks to the model are only applied to the error terms, much as
in the rest of the economic literature.
We use the boot strap method where the shocks are generated by repeatedly drawing random
errors from individual time periods for all equations from the matrix of single equation
residuals (SER), as in Blake (1996). The shocks drawn will have the same contemporaneous
distribution as the empirical distribution of the SER. In this way the historical correlation of
the error terms are maintained across variables, but not through time. We have taken our
model NiGEM, and calculated the historical shocks to all the structural equations for all 1000
estimated relationships. Our set of structural shocks have been applied repeatedly to our
forecast baseline which runs 24 years into the future. Each application produces a new future
history that depends on the set of shocks applied, the ‘counterfactual’ baseline used and the
period in which the shocks are applied. We have applied the shocks quarter by quarter over
the period 1999 to 2003 running the model ‘forward’ to calculate the expectations that would
be a reasonable response to the ‘news’ contained in the shocks. The model is solved for long
enough to ensure the results are independent of the end points of the run. One replication in
the set of stochastic simulations consists of shocking the model in the first quarter, solving
forward for 18 years into the future. We then retain results from that quarter and repeat for
each of the following 19 quarters we are shocking, using the output of the previous run as a
new baseline. A set of replications involves doing this 200 times for each regime. Hence forASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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the results reported in this paper we have a total of 4000 simulations per regime. We show in
a previous paper that after approximately 100 stochastic simulations the variance of potential
outcomes settles down,
13 and hence a sound assessment of the variabilities of outcomes under
different regimes can be made with 200 trial runs and that further simulations would not
change the results noticeably.
In this paper we include shocks to exchange rates, as we think that departures from our
structural exchange rate relationships are important sources of uncertainty in the world we
describe. However, this is not standard practice in these exercises, but this in part reflects the
difficulties that these exercises involve. We argue that any exchange rate uncertainty must be
taken into account in the model and we do this by including shocks to the exchange rate in
the stochastic simulations.
14
6. Asymmetries across Europe – Deterministic simulation results
In this section we assess how the asymmetries across European labour markets can influence
the effectiveness of monetary policy. We take the 3 models of European wage bargaining and
embed them into the NiGEM. We then apply a specific deterministic shock, a loosening of
monetary policy across Europe, to examine how the increasing degree of nominal inertia in
the labour markets affects the different economies. The charts below present the results for a
loosening of monetary conditions in Euroland. In this section we concentrate on some of the
largest member economies and the aggregate as a whole but for the stochastic simulation
results we look at all countries. We simulated a 5% increase in the money supply under each
of the models discussed above.
                                                
13 See Barrell, Dury and Hurst (2000).
14 For a more detailed discussion of the issues involved and the importance of shocking the exchange
rate see Barrell, Dury and Pain (2000).ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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The simulation results clearly show that as the degree of inertia increases in the European
labour markets (moving from Model 1 to Model 3) the slower is the speed of response and
the longer it takes to reach equilibrium. The three charts show the % difference from base for
Euroland inflation, output and unemployment. Price responses are larger and faster in Model
1 than in Models 2 and 3 despite similar out-turns for unemployment. Increasing inertia in the
labour markets in Models 2 and 3 slow down price responses and creates more oscillations in
the model and prolongs the adjustment back to the baseline path.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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The following charts show some individual country results for inflation. The speed of
adjustment coefficient in Germany is reduced from 0.16 in Model 1 to 0.07 in Model 2 and to
0.05 in Model 3. The degree of inertia is also increased in France in Model 2 and 3 but not by
as much. The shock imposed is an expansionary shock to the Euroland economies and
therefore the UK sees much of the effects through the shock to the exchange rate. In Model 2
for the UK the equation has remained the same as in Model 1 and so as the chart shows there
is very little difference in the profile for UK inflation. However, in Model 3 the degree of
inertia in the labour markets is increased as the speed of adjustment coefficient is halved,
falling from 0.10 to 0.05.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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7. The effectiveness of monetary policy - Stochastic simulation results
We concentrate here on the second moments; that is, we assess monetary policy in terms of
how well it can minimise the variability of certain important economic variables, such as the
price level, output, and inflation. The tables below present the results for each Euroland
member country and the UK under the three policy rules. Following the analysis of Bryant et
al (1993), the results from the stochastic simulations are reported as Root Mean Squared
Deviations (RMSDs) from their target path.
15 This summary statistic gives a simple average
of the deviations from target over the whole time period considered. The tables are given in
an index form for an easy comparison to be made. The index value for the variability of
results under the combined rule (CR) and the inflation targeting rule (INF) are given
compared to the nominal GDP targeting rule (NOM). Where stochastic simulation results
give a lower variability than under the Nominal GDP targeting rule, the box is shaded.
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Table 5. Variability of output; Index value for CR and INF (Rule NOM = 100)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CR INFT CR INFT CR INFT
16
GE 98 104 100 108 98 120
FR 95 109 102 119 98 129
SP 99 110 99 122 99 132
IT 99 107 101 111 98 121
NL 99 102 100 105 99 118
BG 100 102 102 109 100 117
PT 99 102 103 107 100 118
IR 100 102 100 106 102 117
FN 94 108 103 114 99 123
OE 100 102 100 104 100 116
EL 98 105 101 111 99 121
UK 105 110 111 115 111 134
Notes:   NOM = Nominal aggregate targeting rule; CR = combined rule; INFT = Inflation targeting rule.
Model 1 = Diverse model of labour markets; Model 2 = Intermediate model of labour markets; Model 3 = common model of labour markets.
                                                
16 Results for inflation targeting under Model 3 are provisional as time constraints prevented enough stochastic simulations to be run.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Table 6. Variability of price level; Index value for CR and INFT (Rule NOM = 100)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CR INFT CR INFT CR INFT
17
GE 82 119 85 115 95 122
FR 92 129 90 117 99 123
SP 94 107 90 111 94 110
IT 85 139 93 115 92 135
NL 87 112 94 113 92 115
BG 90 118 96 116 92 126
PT 93 107 101 110 99 138
IR 95 120 92 111 91 116
FN 94 134 102 133 100 135
OE 92 109 97 104 113 136
EL 81 131 85 124 93 134
UK 80 93 88 89 94 96
Notes:   NOM = Nominal aggregate targeting rule; CR = combined rule; INFT = Inflation targeting rule.
Model 1 = Diverse model of labour markets; Model 2 = Intermediate model of labour markets; Model 3 = common model of labour markets.
                                                
17 Results for inflation targeting under Model 3 are provisional as time constraints prevented enough stochastic simulations to be run.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Table 7. Variability of inflation; Index value for CR and INF (Rule NOM = 100)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CR INFT CR INFT CR INFT
18
GE 97 105 96 107 99 127
FR 95 111 101 114 101 123
SP 97 108 95 117 93 126
IT 100 109 100 104 97 120
NL 98 104 102 109 98 121
BG 99 100 102 105 99 116
PT 102 100 102 98 102 119
IR 96 104 98 109 95 106
FN 100 109 103 109 101 122
OE 100 102 102 104 103 120
EL 93 111 97 118 95 133
UK 98 98 99 95 102 120
Notes:    NOM = Nominal aggregate targeting rule; CR = combined rule; INFT = Inflation targeting rule.
Model 1 = Diverse model of labour markets; Model 2 = Intermediate model of labour markets; Model 3 = common model of labour markets.
                                                
18 Results for inflation targeting under Model 3 are provisional as time constraints prevented enough stochastic simulations to be run.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Summary tables are given below for variabilities of  Euroland as a whole and for the UK.
Table 8 shows the variability of output, inflation and the price level across the different rules
but within a particular model. The results are shown as indices with the nominal rule being
given a value of 100. An easy comparison can then be made to see which rule has the best
stabilisation properties within a particular model.
Table 8: Variabilities in Euroland and the UK across different rules with
 increasing inertia in the labour markets (Index values for CR and
 INFT; NOM = 100)
Euroland UK
Model NOM CR INFT NOM CR INFT
Output 1 100 98 105 100 105 110
2 100 101 111 100 111 115
3 100 99 121 100 111 134
Inflation 1 100 81 131 100 98 98
2 100 85 124 100 99 95
3 100 93 134 100 102 120
Price level 1 100 93 111 100 80 93
2 100 97 118 100 88 89
3 100 95 133 100 94 96
Notes: NOM = Nominal aggregate targeting rule; CR = combined rule; INFT =
Inflation targeting rule Model 1 = Diverse model of labour markets Model
2 = Intermediate model of labour markets; and Model 3 = common model
of labour markets.
Table 8 shows that the variability of output, price level and inflation in the Euro area as a
whole is reduced under the combined nominal aggregate and inflation-targeting rule, CR.
Within each model the variability of output, inflation and the price level increases with a pure
inflation targeting rule. In the UK output is less variable with a nominal targeting rule in each
model of Europe, however, inflation becomes less variable as we concentrate more on an
inflation targeting rule (except in Model 3, the model with the most inertia). Including an
inflation target benefits the UK in terms of reduced price level variability.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Table 8 helps to emphasis the effectiveness of monetary policy as more inertia is introduced
into the labour markets. As we introduce more inertia into the European labour markets we
find that the disparity between the Nominal aggregate rule, NOM, and the Combined rule,
CR, for Euroland falls. This is particularly noticeable in the variability of the price level
where the ratio of RMSDs rises from 81 to 93. The evidence suggests that introducing further
inertia in the labour markets may result in the nominal targeting rule giving lower variability
the for  Euroland aggregates than the combined rule. The tables also show that the
performance of the Euro zone is also worsened as we introduce progressively more inertia in
the labour markets. This is in line with more recent theoretical literature, which argues that
inflation targeting can have destabilising effects.  Clarida,  Gali and  Gertler (1999) and
Svensson and Woodford (1999) have argued that in a simple New-Keynesian model with
inflation targeting the optimal policy results in a stationary price level process. Svensson
(1999) also shows that if output is sufficiently persistent then price level targeting may reduce
both output and inflation variability. The nature of the supply relationship is important here
as Kiley (1998) shows. With a Phillips curve relationship in a new-Keynesian framework it is
possible that output variability might be higher under price level targeting than under
inflation targeting. However, this model changes if it has Taylor style contracting, where
wages or prices depend on past experience and expectations of the future, added to it. It is
then possible that one can design a policy rule that weights output in such a way that inflation
is more stable under price level targeting, as Vestin (1999) shows. We show here that as more
inertia is introduced into these labour markets the performance of the economy under
inflation targeting is worsened. The results for the UK, the more open economy, also show
the same pattern as more inertia is introduced into the UK  labour market the output and
inflation become more volatile and this is particularly the case when inflation targeting is
used. The more inertial the  labour market the better is a nominal rule at  stabilising the
economy.
8. Choice of rule
It is likely that policy makers will not focus solely on the variability of one variable and will
be concerned with the variability of both output and inflation rates and so both will appear in
their loss functions. They may also believe that other non-price variables are an indication of
economic welfare. Large frequent fluctuations in the interest rate may be regarded as
imposing costs on the economy and so may be included in the loss function and this mayASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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change the conclusions about the relative performance of the policy rules. However, for
illustration we concentrate on the output, inflation and the price level. The outcome of any
loss function will depend on the relative weights on its arguments. Where the loss function
has more than one argument, then equal weight is placed on each. We compare the results for
each of the models discussed above. To make the table clearer the nominal rule, NOM, is
given a value of 1, the combined rule, CR, a value of 2 and the inflation targeting rule, INFT,
a value of 3.
Table 9. Preferred rule (least preferred rule) for some illustrative welfare loss functions
Preferred Rule (least preferred rule)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Euroland
Output 2 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3)
Inflation 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3)
Price level 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3)
Output and Price level 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3)
Output and inflation 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3)
Output, inflation and Price level 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3)
UK
Output 1 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3)
Inflation 3 (1) 3 (1) 1 (3)
Price level 2 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1)
Output and Price level 1 (3) 1 (2) 1 (3)
Output and inflation 2 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3)
Output, inflation and Price level 2 (3) 3 (2) 1 (3)
Note: NOM = 1;  CR = 2;  INFT = 3.
The table shows that for each different model we have examined that if we give equal weight
to each element in the loss function the ECB will almost always choose the combined
nominal aggregate, and inflation targeting rule and will never choose to implement an
inflation targeting rule. There is only one case where the ECB may prefer the nominal
aggregate rule, NOM, over the Combined rule, CR, and that is in the second model where
output variability is higher under the combined rule. If the ECB put a weight of over 55% on
output in its welfare loss function then the nominal rule would be preferred to the combinedASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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rule if the loss function included just output and the price level variability. If the loss function
was a combination of just output and inflation and did not include the variability of the price
level then the nominal rule would be preferred if the weight on output were over 50%. If the
loss function was a combination of all three variables and output took a 50% weight with the
price level and inflation taking equally 25%, then ECB would clearly choose the nominal rule
and not the combined rule. Therefore setting policy in a world where the decision-makers
rely on an estimate with more homogeneity in European labour markets than actually exists
could induce the ECB to use the wrong rule.
The results for the UK are more mixed. In terms of inflation as more inertia is introduced into
the labour markets then the Bank of England would change its preferred rule to a nominal
aggregate rule. If the sole concern was the price level then the preferred rule for the UK
economy would always be the combined rule where the price level is included in the
targeting rule however, the choice become more marginal as you move to model 3. This
indicates that any further inertia in the labour markets would result in changing the preferred
rule to a purely nominal aggregate rule. In terms of output the preferred rule is the nominal
aggregate rule and as we move to model 3 this rule becomes progressively more dominant. If
the only objective of the Bank of England was to stabilise inflation and policy was set in a
world where homogeneity in the labour markets was assumed to exist, then the preferred rule
would be a pure inflation targeting rule. However, if inflation targeting is implemented in a
world which is truly heterogeneous, then inflation targeting in this ‘world’ would result in the
wrong rule being used with the largest welfare losses incurred compared to the other two
rules.
9. Conclusion
We have estimated 3 different models for European labour markets, one where the labour
market relationships are separately estimated and assumed to be different, one where the most
statistically acceptable commonalties are imposed and one where common labour market
relationships are imposed across all member countries. We use panel estimation techniques to
test for the imposition of commonalties among countries and found that we can divide the
European economies into a core group, consisting of Germany, Netherlands, Austria and
France, and another periphery group consisting of the southern economies Spain, Italy and
Portugal. However, it is not statistically possible to group all countries together. We found
that the panel estimates progressively introduce more inertia into the European wageASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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bargaining process as we increased the common elements within Europe. The most extreme
versions of a common labour market for Europe could not be justified on the grounds of
statistical tests although it gave plausible and significant results. We took these models and
embedded them into NiGEM. We then used stochastic simulations to determine how much
differences in the transmission process across the European countries matters for monetary
policy design. The choice of loss function weights and the description of the European labour
market both matter in the choice of a preferred rule. We find that there is a sound case for
designing a framework that has the level of a nominal variable, and preferably the price level
as an explicit argument with sufficient weight to ensure that inflation variability is reduced.
There was also some case for including a reaction to short term inflation. We can conclude
that differences in the labour market transmission mechanisms across the European countries
appear to have little immediate relevance to the choice of framework for the setting of
monetary policy for the ECB. If the ECB designs its interest rate policy according to a world
it thinks exists (e.g. where all countries have the same labour market transmission
mechanisms), but where the economies actually do show different responses it would still
probably chose the same rule. However, our conclusions are different for a small open
economy such as the UK. The world that is thought to exist can have a significant bearing on
the type of policy rule implemented and there could be large costs associated with designing
policy in a world that is different from reality.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Annex
A.  Modelling the World Economy
Any model we build should be a description of the world we live in, rather than a description
of the currently fashionable economic theory. However, economic theory tells us a lot about
the world, and gives us strong indications about the structure of our model. It is useful, for
instance to consider both stocks and flows.
•  In a world model we need a description of trade in goods and services, a description of
the structure of foreign assets and liabilities, and links between these and the rest of the
model. The current account flows onto the asset stock, and cumulated current accounts
should affect future income flows.
•  Each country that we wish to study needs a description of its domestic economy. This
can be broken up into sectors, and the minimum would cover the government, the
labour market, consumption behaviour, the supply side of the economy and financial
markets.
•  These elements need to be integrated into a model of longer-term development. We
have tended to use an extended Solow growth model where output grows because the
quantity of labour and capital increase and because there is technical change.
In each area we try to look at the role of relative prices and also at the accumulation of assets.
It is important to avoid ‘black holes’ in the model where income is received by one party, but
where there is no counterparty paying the income (or the reverse for payments).  This is
particularly problematic for a world model as world exports do not equal world imports, and
we have to ensure that the discrepancy does not grow without bound in the forecast or in a
policy analysis.
The model uses a ‘New-Keynesian’ framework, in that agents are presumed to be forward-
looking but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to external events. The
theoretical structure and the relevant simulation properties of NiGEM are described in greater
detail in Barrell and Sefton (1997) and NIESR (1998).
The model is large, but with a common (estimated and calibrated) underlying structure across
all economies. It has complete demand and supply sides, and there is an extensive forward-
looking monetary and financial sector. The model contains a wealth equilibrium for theASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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private sector. Governments are constrained to be solvent, and hence also have an asset
equilibrium. These two constraints tie down the net asset holdings of the external sector. Thus
the long run structure of the model embeds equilibrium capital flows that depend upon these
saving and investment balances as well as on the structure of the world economy. All
countries in the OECD, including South Korea, are modeled separately, as is China. There are
regional blocks for East Asia, Latin America, Africa, OPEC, Miscellaneous Developing
countries, and Developing Europe. The major economies are each represented by 60-90
equation models with around 30 key behavioural relationships.
Model Structure
In this section we give a brief description of each sector – trade, government, consumption,
investment, the labour market, and technical progress along with some discussion of financial
markets and policy reactions. In each case we want to look at the important feedbacks that
stabilise the model in the long run
Trade. We look for demand and relative competitiveness effects, and the latter are important
feedbacks in the model. There are a variety of competitiveness measures we can construct.
For exports we assume that exporters compete against other people who export to the same
market (RPX), and demand is given by the imports in the markets to which the country has
previously exported (S)
DX = l[X(-1)- S(-1) –b*RPX] + c1*DX(-1) + c2*DS +        +  error
and imports depend upon import prices relative to domestic prices (RPM) and on demand
(TFE)
DM = l[M(-1)- TFE(-1) –b*RPM] + c1*DM(-1) + c2*DTFE +        +  error
As exports depend on imports, they will rise together in the model.  We have a similar pattern
for services trade, but relative price elasticities are higher.  In all cases competitiveness
depends in part on domestic prices or costs, and a rise in domestic prices not matched either
by a change in the exchange rate or foreign prices will mean net exports will fall, and hence
output will fall relative to where it would have been. The current account deficit cumulates
onto foreign debt, and this forms part of private sector wealth, and hence current deficits are a
slowly acting stabilising feedback.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Government. It is important to have sketch models of direct and indirect taxes, and of
government spending.  We separately identify transfers to individuals and government
interest payments.  We also have to consider the financing of the government deficit (BUD),
and we allow either money (M) or bond finance (DEBT).
BUD = DM + DDEBT
The debt stock affects interest payments and forms part of private sector wealth.  The model
explicitly recognises the link between monetary and fiscal policy through their effects on the
government budget constraint, and it is wrong to analyse these policies in isolation.
Consumption. This reflects the major component of demand, and hence has the most
important feedbacks in it.  We assume that consumers consider their current income (RPDI
income including non-labour income net of taxes) and their real financial wealth (RNW), and
that interest rates have a potential effect.
DC = l[C(-1) – a*RPDI(-1) – (1-a)*RNW(-1)] +DC(-1) +    + error
This equation is one of the most important we can consider in forecasting. We assume that
wealth is affected by financial markets through equity and bond prices, and hence if these
markets ‘expect’ something in the future then it will be reflected in prices.  News that
changes expectations will cause wealth to be revalued, and hence will affect behaviour now.
Consumers use the financial markets as agents to assess the future. The rate of spending from
wealth (wealth effects) need to be larger than the real interests rate in order for the model to
stabilise.  Wealth effects are an important but slow acting feedback. They link financial
markets, the current account and government to the real economy. A good deal of care needs
to be taken on modeling the acquisition of assets and the effects of revaluations.
Investment. For forecasting purposes it is adequate to model investment with a simple
accelerator model, with some role for the interest rate. However, if we are interested in
growth and the long run structure of the model, we have to relate investment to the capital
stock, and hence we have to model it as a factor demand, relate it to the demand for labour
and link to capacity utilisation. The demand for capital has to depend upon the user cost,
which depends on real interest rates with forward looking expectations of inflation.  We use a
Constant Elasticity of Substitution production function with an estimated elasticity of
substitution of around a half.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Here v denotes returns to scale, g and s are production function scale parameters, and the
elasticity of substitution, s, is given by 1/(1+r). If s = 1 (r=0), the production is Cobb
Douglas. Variables K and L denote the net capital stock and labour input measured in terms
of employee hours. The production function allows for the possibility of labour augmenting
technical progress. The parameters of the production function vary across countries and w, c
and p denote respectively labour costs per head, nominal user costs of capital and the price of
value added (at factor cost) and b denotes the mark-up. Imposing long-run constant returns to
scale (v=1) we obtain log-linear factor demand equations of the form:
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We estimate these as error corrections around the long run, but there is a lot of calibration.
Capacity utilisation affects price setting and depends on actual as compared to desired capital,
and once again this is one of the central feedbacks in the model. If output is above capacity
prices rise more rapidly than their determinants (foreign prices, costs, expectations) would
suggest, and the reverse is the case if the economy is below capacity.  If prices fall relative to
baseline because the economy is below capacity then real financial wealth rises, and
competitiveness improves, and both help raise capacity utilisation through higher domestic
demand and exports. These effects stabilise the economy slowly.
The Labour Market contains another important feedback, but again this is difficult to model
outside the core OECD countries.  We have a labour demand curve, and we assume that
employers have a right to manage, and hence the bargain in the labour market is over the real
wage.  In the long run wages rise in line with productivity all else equal. Other factors matter,
for instance if unions become stronger real wages rise and employment falls. Given the
determinants of the trajectory for real wages, if unemployment rises then real wages fall
relative to trend, and conversely. Hence unemployment acts as an important feedback.
However, this only works if labour supply is inelastic or fixed. It is inappropriate as a model
where there are large reserves of labour and other measures of labour market excess supply
have to be used. In our modeling we allow expectations of the future to affect the dynamic
path of the bargain, at least where we can find evidence that this matters.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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There is continual structural change in labour markets and sustainable unemployment
changes when policies change, and we have to continually update our model so that it reflects
the economies we are studying, rather than being just a simple description of past data. Both
the determinants of equilibrium and the dynamics of adjustment change, and adjustment,
especially in Europe is slow.
We assume that labour markets embody rational expectations, at least where we have
evidence that bargainers use forward expectations of future inflation (Anderton and Barrell,
1995). However, not all countries display forward elements in the wage bargain, and we have
not found them in Germany, the Netherlands or Austria. In certain circumstances we assume
that wage bargainers do not use model consistent expectations, but rather look at a simple
time series predictor for next periods inflation.
Financial markets  affect asset prices. For most purposes we assume that exchange rate
markets are forward looking, and exchange rates ‘jump’ when there is news.  The size of
jumps depends on the effects on interest rates that are anticipated for the future, and hence
policy rules affect financial markets. We assume that bond and equity markets are also
forward looking, and long-term interest rates reflect short rates that are expected in the future.
In forecasts we normally ‘read’ interest rates for the future from long-term rates, and set paths
for exchange rates in line with interest differentials. Occasionally we claim to know more
than the market.
The forward-looking nature of these markets is central to model properties, and especially in
shocks such as that in East Asia and Latin America. The model is solved in a sequence of
loops, utilising the sparse structure of forward links in time. A shock is applied, and the
model is run over the full time period, and interest rates are allowed to be endogenous. A fall
in demand will, for instance, cut interest rates. Forward looking agents know this, and we
emulate this knowledge by running the model a second time, but calculating the long rate as
the forward convolution of short rates in the previous run. The model is continually run
forward and starts again, and this is repeated until a solution is found where rates of growth
of expected variables are constant at the terminal date, and all equations are converged. In
particular, long-term interest rates are forward convolutions, and this period’s exchange rate
depends on that next period adjusted through the arbitrage condition but short term interest
rate differentials. This algorithm is a version of Fair-Taylor set up in the way Hall (1986)
recommends.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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Policy rules are important in ‘closing the model’ and we have them for fiscal and monetary
policy. We assume budget deficits are kept within bounds in the longer term, and taxes rise to
do this.  This simple feedback rule is important in ensuring the long run stability of the
model.  Indeed, as Blanchard, 1986, shows, without a solvency rule (or a no Ponzi games
assumption) there is no solution to a forward-looking model. We can describe the simple
fiscal rule as
Taxt = Taxt-1 + f [GBRT – GBR]
Where Tax is the direct tax rate, GBR and GBRT are the government surplus target and
actual surplus, and f is the feedback parameter designed to remove an excess deficit in less
that five years.
We also assume that the monetary authorities target something (we allow a large variety of
rules) that stabilise the price level or the inflation rate in the long term. The speed of response
of the authorities affects the properties of the model. In our forward-looking world the
expectation that interest rates would be lower would mean that the exchange rate would
decline now. This would improve competitiveness in the short run and would raise demand.
This would eventually increase prices as compared to where they would have been.  If the
target for the money stock were raised by 10 percent the exchange rate would have to fall by
10 percent or so in the first period to put the economy on the path to equilibrium. This sort of
policy analysis is easy to undertake, and involves one simple change.  We can also change
either the target rate of growth of the nominal aggregate or the rate of inflation, and analyse
the effects of the dynamics of inflation on the model.
B  Stochastic Simulations
Within the framework of stochastic simulations, different sets of shocks are repeatedly
applied to the model. These shocks are taken at random from a particular distribution. By
repeatedly simulating the model in this way the moments of the solution of the endogenous
variables can be calculated and the uncertainty of the model investigated. Stochastic
simulation can be either in respect to the error terms, coefficient estimates or both. In this
paper we assume that the coefficient estimates are known with certainty and the stochastic
shocks to the model are only applied to the error terms.ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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The method used is known as the boot strap method where the shocks are generated by
repeatedly drawing random errors from the matrix of single equation residuals (SER). The
shocks drawn will have the same distribution as the empirical distribution of the SER, which
is assumed to be normally distributed, N(0,s
2). There are a number of other methods for
drawing the shocks which rely on generating pseudo-random shocks which are consistent
with the historical residuals or specifying the variance-covariance matrix (see Ireland and
Westaway 1990 for a description).
One of the main techniques used for generating shocks is the McCarthy algorithm (1972).
This approach uses the formula to generate a vector of shocks:
S = T
0.5 rU
where S is the vector of random shocks, r is the 1 x  T vector of random numbers with
distribution N(0,1) and U is the T x M matrix of disturbances from T observations and M
structural equations. The properties of S tend to the true structural errors as T tends to infinity,
giving an asymptotic estimate of the true covariance matrix.
The method we are using takes the actual historical residuals but are picked at random from
the SER matrix. In this way computational requirements before the model is solved are
reduced considerably.
There are X stochastic equations in NIGEM, x post recursive and x identity equations. The
period taken to calculate the single equation residuals is 1993Q1 to 1997Q4. Each stochastic
equation is shocked in the first period with a random drawing of its errors over this historical
period and the model is then solved forward to calculate expectations. This can be thought of
as being equivalent to a single deterministic simulation.
A second random drawing of error terms is then made and applied to each stochastic equation
in the following period, and again the model is solved forward. This is repeated for all time
periods being stochastically simulated and is known as a ‘trial’. Each trial will consist of T
(time period for which we are stochastically simulating) draws of X (number of stochastic
equations) values. This can be done as many times as desired and each trial will yield an
estimate of the endogenous variables for each time period. This can be done as many times as
desired and each trial will yield an estimate of the endogenous variables for each time period.
It is important to solve the model far enough into the future so that the results in a trial
solution period are not affected by the terminal date. In this paper we stochastically shock theASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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model over the first 5 years of our forecast baseline but each time a shock is applied, the
model is solved forward to 2017q1. For a 5 year solution period, each trial consists of 20
simulations and we undertook 200 stochastic trials for each rule. Therefore the total number
of simulations undertaken in this paper was 4000 (20 X 200)
After running the stochastic simulations the moments can be calculated. The expected value
of each endogenous variable, at time t, is obtained by dividing the sum of all trial estimates at
time t by the number of trials:
~ $ y
J
y it it
j
j
J
=
= ￿
1
1
where  it
j y ~
 is the value of the jth trial of variable i in period t; J is the number of trials
taken.
Given J trials, the stochastic simulation estimate of the variance for level variables such as
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2 ~ s  denotes the estimated variance of the variable i in period t, it
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jth trial of variable i in period t,  it
B y  is the value of variable i on the base in period t, and J is
the number of trials taken. This will give a time series of estimated variances for each
variable. We then take a simple average of this series over N  time periods and take the
square root to give a simple summary statistic to help assess the performance of the policy
rules over the whole time period. The summary statistic given in the following tables are the
RMS%Ds, i.e.
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For variables such as interest rates and the inflation rate, absolute deviations are measured in
percentage points, i.e. the RMSD for the interest rate, r, would be:ASYMMETRIC LABOUR MARKETS IN A CONVERGING EUROPE: DO DIFFERENCES MATTER?
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where r
j
t is the value of the interest rate for trial j in period t and rBt is the value of the interest
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